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The Tabor Lecture
ON LIVING ONE WAY IN TOWN AND
ANOTHER WAY AT HOME*
THOMAS L. SHAFFER**
The title of this Lecture is from Harper Lee's novel To Kill a Mockingbird.
The occasion for the proposition is when the smalltown southern gentleman-
lawyer Atticus Finch is given an opportunity to lie to protect his son from harm.
He refuses. He says that the most important thing he has for his son is not
protection but integrity. He says, "I can't live one way in town and another
way in my home. " '
The aspiration has had a particular focus among lawyers in the United
States. It crosses generations and is resolved across the sexes in Louis
Auchincloss's fussy little novel Diary of a Yuppie.2 Auchincloss' usual staid
New York law firm has been dragged kicking and screaming to the "M and A"
practice-into mergers and acquisitions, corporate takeovers. The elder lawyer-
mentor, Braders Blakelock, has gone along with the development, although he
suspects that takeover practice is no work for a gentleman. The younger
lawyer, the yuppie, Robert Service, is enthusiastic for representing corporate
raiders. He is about to be made a partner, due in no small part to his skill in
that sort of legal combat.
In one of the firm's cases, the "target" company, Shaughnessy Products,
is attacked by the firm's client, Atlantic Rylands. Shaughnessy, the target, is
headed by a golfing partner of Mr. Blakelock's named Albert Lamb. Mr. Lamb
is resisting the takeover; his company has adopted inconvenient "shark
repellents"; his lawyers are putting up a fight, which so far does not complicate
* This was the inaugural Glenn Tabor Lecture in Legal Ethics, at Valparaiso University, February
13, 1997. In the program for the occasion, Mr. Tabor's "county seat law practice" (to use his title
for it), in Valparaiso (Porter County), Indiana, was identified as "a model of a small community of
colleagues who care about one another and who live the same ethical commitments in the law office
that they do in their homes." I dedicate this printed version of the lecture to Mr. Tabor, in
appreciation for his example to Hoosier lawyers and for his generosity to Valparaiso University.
.. B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame;
supervising attorney, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic; member of the Indiana Bar. I am grateful for
the assistance of Edward M. Gaffney, Linda Harrington, Patrick Schiltz, and Nancy J. Shaffer.
1. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 267 (Fawcett Popular Library ed. 1962) (1960).
2. Louis AUCHINCLOSS, DIARY OF A YUPPIE (1986).
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his playing golf with Mr. Blakelock. So far they are both able to act like
gentlemen.
The problem is that Mr. Lamb's shark repellents may be successful. The
raider, Atlantic Rylands, and its lawyers, Blakelock and Service, are in need of
ways to pressure Mr. Lamb to sell his company. Robert Service, the Yuppie,
without asking anybody, has employed informants who collect and go through
the trash from Mr. Lamb's office. Robert calls the contents of the trash bags
"abandoned property."
He pastes together a shredded accounting document and finds that Mr.
Lamb has given his ne'er-do-well brother Hendrickson a job at the company and
has covered up Hendrickson's subsequent thefts from company funds. Mr.
Blakelock knew about this: "Al has always looked after the poor nut," as he
puts it. This came at no cost to the company: Mr. Lamb reimburses the
company for Hendrickson's salary and restores everything Hendrickson steals.
Service suggests that Mr. Blakelock's client threaten a shareholder's
derivative lawsuit against Mr. Lamb, based on the irregular way Mr. Lamb
looks after his brother. The legal ground is weak, but it is on the safe side of
frivolous; there is nothing in the professional rules that prohibits the threat. The
embarrassment and pressure will be significant: Mr. Lamb will perhaps cave
in and sell his company after the threat is made. If not, the suit might result in
Mr. Lamb's being removed as the company's chief executive officer, and then
Mr. Service will perhaps face a more tractable target. "What can we lose... by
taking the chance?" Service says.
Mr. Blakelock refuses the suggestion. He and Robert have a noisy and
fruitless argument about it. Mr. Blakelock invokes what sound like moral
propositions, without giving them substance-words such as "duty" and
'obscene," and especially "honor." He seems to think it should be obvious to
young Robert Service that those words fit what he calls Robert's "mud
slinging." Service wonders what is wrong with mud-slinging, in reference to
duty and honor. Mr. Blakelock believes that if Service has to ask there is no
answer that would persuade him; he does not say what is wrong with mud-
slinging in the practice of law or wherein mud-slinging offends duty; what he
says is that using trash for information is obscene, and threatening an immaterial
lawsuit is not honorable.
Service is not moved by what Mr. Blakelock says about duty and honor.
Mr. Blakelock is not moved by Robert's insistence that what he wants to do is
within professional rules (which it is) and within a lawyer's loyalty to the
lawyer's client. "I'd sling any mud I could make stick," Robert says. The two
lawyers are in moral gridlock; they are unable to get into the give and take of
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discussion. What they say to one another is not like the ethical discourse both
of them looked at in college. It would not have interested Socrates and
Protagoras, or the Rabbis of the Talmud.
Finally, his "shoulders . . . stooped with . . .a rather melodramatic
expression of dismay and grief," Mr. Blakelock says to Mr. Service: "Go
home, Robert! Go home before I lose my temper! Take the weekend off; stay
away from the office. Tell your darling wife what you have told me and listen
carefully to what she says.... Let her help you, my boy. Let her guide you!
I fear I must have been a false leader." 3
The Blakelock-Service encounter is a kind of moral argument; that is, it is
an argument in which the people involved use moral words. But it is not a
discussion in ethics. Ethics is an intellectual activity in which the participants
talk about morals and exercise in conversation the arts of insight and persuasion,
without coercion. In ethics, the people involved hope to reach one another.
Think here of Aristotle's academy, of Thomas Aquinas at the University of
Paris, or of Bill Moyers and his friends discussing Genesis, and of the ethics
courses taught here at Valparaiso by Professor Laura Dooley and Deans David
Vandercoy and Edward Gaffney. You could get some good talk going, in any
of these places, about duty and honor. Not so, for some reason, in Mr.
Blakelock's law office.
But Mr. Blakelock's order that Service take the weekend off and talk to his
wife suggests the hope that conversation in ethics might occur at home-and it
does. The conversation at home4 is not ethics in the law office. You could say
that ethics occurs in this story, at home, but legal ethics, in town, does not.
You could even say that the story says that, while there may be such a thing as
ethics for lawyers, there is no such thing as legal ethics. Issues are certainly
resolved in the Blakelock law office. No derivative lawsuit is filed, for
example. But the resolution is the result not of ethical discourse, but of power:
3. Id. at 11; this part of the story is in ch. 1, 1-11.
4. Examples of lawyers talking ethics at home-one that has proved popular among modern
American lawyers-are in Robert Bolt's play about Sir Thomas More, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS
(Vintage Books ed. 1962) (1960). In that story, for several instances among many, (i) More and
the eminently corruptible Richard Rich talk, in More's home, about the moral advantages of Rich's
being a school teacher rather than a politician (id. at 3-6); (ii) More and his daughter's fiance
William Roper talk, in More's home, about the ethics of Lutheran piety (id. at 35); (iii) More,
Roper, and Lady Alice discuss, in More's home, the morals of law practice (id. at 37, 54); and (iv)
More and his daughter Margaret talk, on the road to More's home, about the ethics of martyrdom
(id. at 72-73).
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Mr. Blakelock orders Service not to proceed (and, by the way, the hostile
takeover fails).
The story also suggests that a lawyer of Robert Service's sort is willing to
live one way at home and another way in town, Atticus Finch to the contrary
notwithstanding. It suggests a subject for this Tabor Lecture.
The separation of town from home is an old one in the history of lawyers
in America. When you trace the nineteenth-century development of legal ethics,
from David Hoffman's first Resolutions on Professional Deportment, of 1817, 5
through the first A.B.A. Canons of 1908,6 you find the exact separation of
moral spheres that you find in Robert Service's law practice: On the "town"
side there is an exalted ideology that doesn't dig in enough to be either insight
or persuasion.7 When you focus on, say, the 1890s, you notice that American
law-firm ideology is like the portraits of dead partners on the law-office wall:
It is for announcement, not for disputation. The town side of a lawyer's life,
at least since the days of the robber barons, has invoked an exalted set of grand
words while it lived by a consistently crude set of professional rules that would
not, and did not, get in the way of getting ahead.'
Which does not mean that life in town has had no moral point of reference:
The practice of law in America has depended, not on its grand words in town,
but, as Mr. Blakelock seemed to understand, on what lawyers have at home.
When American lawyers have taken moral pause, it has been because of a
restlessness evoked in them by their home side-by the selves they have from
family, neighborhood, congregation, and friends at home. From mothers, I
think, mostly.
5. Reproduced and discussed in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT,
READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS 59-164 (1985).
6. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES AND STATUTES 347-62 (1995) (John S.
Dzienkowski ed. 1995).
7. The "meta-ethical" argument here owes a good deal to Alasdair Maclntyre, Does Applied
Ethics Rest on a Mistake?, 67 THE MONIST 498 (1984).
8. Michael Schudson traces the history in Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The
Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 191 (1977),
reproduced and discussed in supra note 5, at 183-86, 315-30, and in Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REv. 697 (1988). The American Bar
Association's rule-making effort culminated, for the present, in the 1983 proposed Rules of
Professional Conduct, reproduced in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES AND
STATUTES, supra note 6, at 3-128, adopted as modified by the Supreme Court of Indiana, IND. R.
OF CT. 357-94 (West 1995), which generally excise traditional American-lawyer words of ethical
argument.
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American lawyers learn the moral virtues-truthfulness, courage, justice,
and the other virtues-at home. They learn them at home from early childhood,
in the way Aristotle and the Book of Proverbs say they should learn them: by
formation, begun even before they learn to talk, formation that is well along, as
Aristotle-and Sigmund Freud-said, before moral choice is even intelligible.
And when the child's mind seeks words for ethics, she finds that she has already
learned the words, as Miss Manners says, "[Tihe language of behavior, like
other languages, is most easily learned when one is too young to think about
it. "9
In Auchincloss' story, at home, Robert Service's wife Alice zeroes in not
on mud-slinging but moral quality. Not on what Robert is doing so much as on
what he is becoming. She worries, she says, about "the glee with which you
ferret around in ash cans." She reminds Robert of the person he was when he
read poems to her in college. She gets his attention, as Mr. Blakelock could
not, when she notices that he is drifting: His virtues are drifting; his character
is drifting. You have become, she says, "hard boiled. Or perhaps I should put
it that you're trying to get hard-boiled. As if you thought there was something
desirable about being cool and clear and above it all and looking down on poor
scrapping mortals." 10 My wife Nancy made a similar observation about me,
when I was a young lawyer.
That is ethics. It is insight. It turns out to be provocative for Robert. He
later writes in his diary, "I was cruelly hurt" " at what Alice said. Alice didn't
read that. If she had, she might have responded with a few words from St.
Paul's first letter to Corinth, from a text that was probably read at their
wedding: "Love rejoices in the truth."" That, too, would have been ethics.
What I want to identify is the possibility that Robert might want to live in
the office as he lives at home. Perhaps he might want his law office to be a
place of ethical discourse as well as a place where power is imposed. I wonder
why he cannot stay in town and talk-really talk-to Mr. Blakelock about the
morals of using "abandoned property" for corporate threat.
I suppose the answer is that our divided moral system has had the
advantages Service claimed for it. The principal advantage has been moral
freedom in using legal power-power enough for lawyers to have done great
9. Judith Martin, Parents Seeing Light, Teaching Their Children Manners, S. BEND TRIB., Jan.
26, 1997, at F2.
10. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 2, at 23-29.
11. Id. at 25. Robert Service turns out to be a moral pigmy, but also turns out to be under the
continuing ethical influence of Alice.
12. 1 Corinthians 13:6.
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things in America: to have devised charters for economic expansion, for the
development of the West, for the Industrial Revolution. Legal power, thus freed
from moral reluctance, invokes bravery and cleverness. It ties its
creativity-much of it more disgusting than the use of "abandoned
property"-and its brilliance to the grand claims that this country has a special
destiny, that we are the "indispensable nation," that American law is an altar,
and that American lawyers are a priesthood. 3 The interesting thing for present
purposes is that these ambitious moral claims seem not to have been discussable;
they have not been interesting for ethics.
That result is illustrated by occasional radical dissent. The late Christian
lawyer William Stringfellow, for one example, said he avoided thinking of
himself as a "professional." He was, he said, a biblical person who worked as
a lawyer. 4 He remained on the home side of his moral consciousness, I
suppose. He resolved our question by despairing of finding useful moral
guidance in town, as I think the organized profession, and Mr. Blakelock, and
the courts have done.' 5 From any of these points of view, there is now no
such thing as legal ethics. The moral claims American lawyers make on Law
Day and in bar-journal pep talks are without ethical content. By which I mean
that they cannot be discussed seriously in town. Neither duty-and-honor, nor
the Bible, encourages discussion in town on how a biblical person goes about
working as a lawyer. Duty and honor are made not to mean anything, and few
lawyers pull anything concrete from the Bible-not in town.
6
Why, if that is so, is the subject of "professional conduct" in town called
"legal ethics?" Why do its practitioners still invoke that title?' 6 Well, for one
thing, the system called legal ethics (or ."professional responsibility") has a
number of advantages for a licensed aggregation of people who exercise power
in a "pluralistic" society. When it comes to getting the job done, as Robert
Service finally admitted in his conversation with his wife, it is better not to say
13. SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 65.
14. Discussed in Milner S. Ball, A Meditation on Vocation, in RADICAL CHRISTIAN AND
EXEMPLARY LAWYER 129 (Andrew W. McThenia ed. 1995), and in Bill Wylie-Kellermann, "Listen
to This Man, ": A Parable Before the Powers, 53 THEOLOGY TODAY 299 (1996).
15. Professor William J. Stuntz argues, for example, that the modem American judiciary is
"too proud, too sure of its own ability" and at the same time too timid about "standing up for what's
right"-on the one hand inclined to be a braggart, where exercise of power is the issue, and on the
other inclined to moral cowardice. William J. Stuntz, Pride and Pessimism in the Courts, FIRST
THINGS, Feb. 1997, at 22, 27.
16. The Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 8, of course, do not, nor do those law
schools that have substituted "professional responsibility" for legal ethics. Nonetheless (as to law
schools), there is a fair amount of vigorous ethical discourse in sessions of the required courses in
the field. Schools, possibly because they stand between home and town, seem able to detect the
remnants of moral impulses that make ethics possible.
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anything coherent-understandable, thoughtful, open to reasoned response
-about moral reasons for what we do.
I imagine that Mr. Blakelock might have obtained agreement on his policy
against what he calls mud-slinging from three randomly selected partners of his,
if he had asked them for a ruling on what Robert Service planned to do to Mr.
Lamb. But it would have threatened his purpose to get into their reasons for
disapproval. One partner might have reasoned that a derivative lawsuit against
Mr. Lamb would have been a misuse of the judiciary. Another might have
thought it a form of what we old-fashioned Catholics learned to call
"detraction." Mr. Blakelock himself, if pressed on what he means when he
talks about "honor," might have said that, after all, he and Mr. Lamb belonged
to the same country club. Three partners might have agreed on a result. Stating
their reasons for agreement would, though, have undermined the agreement.
Mr. Blakelock did not consult his partners; he resolved the crisis with
power: Robert Service was not to sling mud and he was to take the weekend off
and talk about morals with his wife. But if Mr. Blakelock had sought a
governing committee's resolution, it would have been best to limit the
transaction to a conclusion-a moral conclusion, probably, but not an ethical
conclusion. Best to keep ethics out of it. I don't argue that what Robert wanted
to do to Mr. Lamb was immoral, although maybe it is, it being, perhaps, as
wrong to hit someone on the head with the law as to hit him on the head with
a club. My ethical observation is that these lawyers seem to have had only
coercive ways to work together-not ethics but power with a moral label-a
moral label with a warning: Don't ask.
Don't ask. It was important to keep the moral label, to keep the grand
words "duty" and "honor," provided those words were not to be poked at "in
the tangle of [the] mind."" Power, the ability to keep things as they are, the
ability to retain advantage for those who have advantage, needs moral words.
Words, among American lawyers, such as those we append to the label "officers
of the court," for example; words, among Americans in general, of patriotism
and civil religion. People are moral creatures; they require moral words. But
these are cases of moral words whose meanings are not to be talked about.
Officers of the court, patriotism, and civil religion are about power, not about
ethics.
William Gladstone was a pain to his colleagues in the House of Commons,
to the Queen, and to Benjamin Disraeli, because he did not understand this. He
17. The phrase is from Bolt's More, supra note 4, at 73: "God made the angels to show him
splendor-as he made animals for innocence and plants for their simplicity. But Man he made to
serve him wittily, in the tangle of his mind!"
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was routinely accused of being moralistic; Queen Victoria hated to talk to him
and despised his letters, because he took every opportunity to preach to her. He
did not follow, with everybody else, the modem moral tradition for exercising
state power. He once said of himself that he had a manner that tended to turn
every conversation into a debate. He was too interested in ethics; he did not
understand that grand moral claims by the state are not for ethical discussion."S
A quaint set of examples closer to home are nineteenth-century American
judicial opinions and bar-association pronouncements on why women cannot be
lawyers. 9 That bad judicial poetry on the delicacy and moral superiority of
women, and on the crude necessities of law practice, trace to the beginnings of
the Industrial Revolution, when families were divided between female parents,
who formed children in the moral virtues, and male parents who went out from
home to develop America; Auden later said they were "bound for a borough all
bankers revere. "20 The male parents spoke of manifest destiny, of America as
the city on the hill, God's new Israel. Those words were not for ethical
analysis. The more perceptive users of them knew that; for the others, the
grand moral words were marketed with an implicit warning on the label: Don't
ask.
You can find other examples in the literature on moral dilemmas that we
professors assemble for students in courses on "professional responsibility."
One example is a persistent reluctance to talk seriously about the American
lawyer's adversary ethic; another is the extension of the adversary ethic to law-
office practice. The unexamined moral pronouncement on the adversary ethic,
as practiced in court, is that the state requires contention; justice is not
something you get from lawyers; you get justice from the state. A minority on
the commission that drafted the old Code of Professional Responsibility in the
1960s asked why the adversary ethic is applicable in office practice, where the
state is not involved, where justice is something people give to one another.
The answer from the majority was: Don't ask.2
Another example is the rule against providing "financial assistance to a
client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation."' Under that rule
and its predecessors, lawyers are haled before bar committees and courts for
giving clients money to feed their children.23 I have wondered if I violated it,
18. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, Most Eminent Victorian, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1997, at 88.
19. SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 412-15.
20. W.H. AUDEN , THE AGE OF ANXIETY 73 (1947).
21. Harry W. Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L. REV.
957 (1978), reprinted in SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 436.
22. IND. R. PROF. CONDUCT ANN. Rule 1.8(e).
23. See the cases identified in MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 143-44 (1992).
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years ago, when I left five dollars at the Indiana State Prison, so my client there
could have cigarettes. (Legal analysis says not, since his smoking was not in
connection with litigation. I was trying to get my client out of prison, not to get
him money for tobacco.) I now, in legal-aid work, frequently have clients I
want to help out a bit-with my own money. It is best, when I really must do
that, to launder my money through some other agency in town. There is
nothing remarkable about that, nothing interesting for ethics. It is to deal with
the professional rule the way we lawyers deal with the Internal Revenue Code.
Some lawyers I know took a risk, just before Christmas, for a client after
a judge told her she could have her baby with her for the holidays if she had a
bed for the baby. She had no baby bed and no money to buy a baby bed. It
was the week before Christmas; the Christ Child Society was closed; her
lawyers bought the bed and kept their heads down-until this startling revelation
from me.
The Virginia State Bar adopted a rule, when I was teaching down there,
requiring a lawyer to report her client's stated intention to commit a crime-any
crime. I talked to a cross-section of Virginia lawyers about that rule; all of
them said they would not follow it unless the crime was very serious. Suppose,
one of them said, a client wondered about submitting a post-dated document for
tax purposes. The lawyer would, of course, refuse to prepare the document.
Then, suppose, the client said, "Okay, I will do it myself." That is a stated
intention to commit a crime. Some lawyers said they would violate the rule
against reporting the client. That was a case, I suppose, of life at home
intruding on life in town. Others suggested that the thing to do was to inform
the client of the new Virginia "whistle blower" rule; at which point, surely, the
client would say, "All right. I won't do it," and the ethical dilemma would be
removed. That was to use legal analysis in town, to avoid ethics. One solution
is like the baby-bed case; the other is like laundering money. None of those
lawyers would tell on their clients. No Virginia lawyer I talked to had ever told
on a client. 24
One wonders, given that reaction, why Virginia lawyers adopted a whistle-
blower rule. The answer is, I think, that it is a "don't ask" case. It and the
Indiana financial-assistance rule involve bits of law that are, in the morals one
has at home, to be violated, or, in the morals one has in town, to be dealt with
the way lawyers deal with rules of law-with analysis and evasion. At home
24. I discussed these episodes in more detail in Thomas L. Shaffer, Beyond the Rules:
The Responsibility and Role of Continuing Legal Education to Teach Alternative Ethical
Considerations, in AMERICAN LAW INSTUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, C.L.E. AND THE
LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN EVOLVING PROFESSION 493 (Report on the Arden House ni
Conference 1988).
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such a resolution is virtually instinctive-"virtually," as in "virtue"; in town it
is merely legal.
I am not free, in town, to make a moral argument for being able to buy my
client a baby bed; that rule is not available for moral argument. It was obtained
through the collective power of insurance-company lawyers, who won the only
argument necessary when they got the rule adopted. I am not free to make a
moral argument in favor of deserving my client's trust when, in his trust, he
tells me he will violate the criminal law; that rule is not available for moral
argument. It is maintained in the "officer of the court" tradition among
patrician Virginia lawyers who won the only argument necessary when they got
the rule adopted.
You no doubt have thought about moral arguments questioning every step
I have taken here. I hope so; our talking about it would be ethics, and I like
ethics. I even wish there might some day come to be such a thing as legal
ethics. Perhaps we could discover legal ethics together, as Socrates said he and
Thrasymachus would discover together what justice is. 5 But, for now, I need
to return to the question I mean particularly to present. These examples all
show, I think, how American lawyers have learned to live one way in town and
another way at home. If one of us proposed to try to live the same way in town
and at home, and if she wanted guidance worthy of university discussion on that
aspiration, where might she turn?
She would not be happy with what she would find if she turned to the
history of lawyers in America. The separation of home and town goes back to
the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. A modem lawyer seeking to live the same
way at home and in town would not be much happier with the current judicial,
bar-association, and journalistic efforts to encourage civility among lawyers.26
25. Republic 1:348, in EDITH HAMILTON & HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, PLATO: THE COLLEcTED
DIALOGUES 597 (1961):
If then we oppose him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just
and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed
in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between
us. But if... we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry,
we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders.
26. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct, D.C. BAR REP., Aug.-
Sept. 1996, at 8; Thomas J. Paprocki, Ethics in the Everyday Practice of Law, 35 CATH. LAW. 169
(1994); Monroe H. Freedman, Civility Runs Amok, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995. For a more
general discussion of cultural civility, see Ken Moore, U.S. Led in Technology . . . and Into
Rudeness, S. BEND TRIB., Dec. 8, 1996, at F7; Ellen Goodman, Civility May Be Making Long-
awaited Comeback, S. BEND TRIB., Jan. 3, 1997, at A4; Mark A. Doty, The Decline of Civility in
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The civility campaign appeals to the "values" of the American gentleman-
lawyer. There is nothing the matter, certainly, with being civil. We admirers
of Miss Manners are, in fact, likely to praise and admire civility, even if we
also remember how often Miss Manners insists that she does not mean to be
writing about ethics.27 Civility is as inoffensive as General Lee's rule, for his
little college in Virginia,2" that a person should say hello when he passes
another person on the sidewalk.
Miss Manners and the American gentleman-lawyer seek to avoid causing
pain to others. American lawyers would surely be better off if they tried harder
not to cause pain to others. But they would deceive themselves if they thought
that not causing pain was an adequate morality for what lawyers do. Lawyers
necessarily cause pain to others. Robert Service, in seeking to attack the noble
Albert Lamb, was right to point that out. It is too bad that he and Mr.
Blakelock could not then have talked about it.
I do not find the promise I would hope for in the history of American
lawyers or in the tradition that gives rise to pronouncements on civility. I see
promise in two other sources. One is feminist ethics. The other is religious
ethics. I will leave off here with a few hints on what those familiar sources
might offer to lawyers who want to live the same way in town and at home.
Feminist ethics occurs to me immediately because it is not solemn about
rules. In the nineteenth century, the mothers who were left at home to form
their children in the virtues understood and practiced a morality of good habits
in which rules are reminders of deeper formation, formation begun long before
the imposition of rules.29 The rule against telling lies, for example, comes
later than formation in the virtue of truthfulness. It is not pressed to the point
America, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 23, 1983, at 1093. "Decency" is perhaps a similar moral
appeal, as in HENRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON DECENCY,
LAW, AND PORNOGRAPHY (1996).
27. Ethics, she says, derives its authority from morals, whereas etiquette derives its authority
from manners. JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS RESCUES CIVILIZATION 123 (1996).
28. Washington and Lee.
29. SALLY B. PURVIS, THE POWER OF THE CROSS: FOUNDATIONS FOR A CHRISTIAN FEMINIST
ETHIC OF COMMUNITY (1993); Kathryn Tanner, The Care That Does Justice: Recent Writings in
Feminist Ethics and Theology, 24 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 171 (1996); Marilyn Friedman, Feminism
and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, ETHICS, Jan. 1989, at 275; William C. Spohn,
Liberating Conscience, AM., Jan. 18, 1997 (discussing Anne E. Patrick's new book of that name).
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where a person cannot lie to save a life, or even lie to keep his mother from
being bothered by salesmen. There is a difference between being truthful,
which is a good habit, and not telling lies, which is a rule.'
Because of its emphasis on formation in good habits-and on experience,
to use a word common among feminist scholars-feminist ethics is likely to
blink at a court rule that is marketed with the "don't ask" label. Feminists are
likely to insist on ethics, that is, on persuasion and insight, in town-now that
women have come to town. Catharine MacKinnon speaks thus of the crunch,
which, she says, is the noise the law makes when it collides with somebody's
life. 3'
It is mildly perilous to generalize broadly from the vast literature of
feminist ethics, but I am willing to guess that its influence among lawyers will
mean:
* an emphasis on character formed in community, which could redeem
the deepest aspirations of the traditional American gentleman-lawyer;
* a procedure of mutual respect in ethical deliberation, rather than a
reliance on moral rules announced by authority; and
" a stance among at least some lawyers, women and men, that sees and
talks about the evils in the systems we lawyers manipulate, control,
and impose. 32
30. A point argued at some length, with some dependence on feminist ethics, in Thomas L.
Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 195 (1996).
31. Quoted in Fred Strebeigh, Defining Law on the Feminist Frontier, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct.
6, 1991, at 28, 30.
32. Spohn, supra note 29, at 24, generalizes to four moral concerns in Patrick's work: (i)
(Substantive) justice as the central moral concern in an ethic of justice; (ii) responsibility
and mutuality, rather than (or tempering) domination and obedience; (iii) a universal call to holiness
arising from baptism; and (iv) less what is wrong and what is left, and therefore permissible, than
(instead) "a more prophetic stance to challenge the systemic evils in society and the church." He
says,
Conscience . relies on communal wisdom rather than individual insight over against the
group. Conscience should not be limited to applying moral principles in cases. It is the
capacity to... shape the quality of one's character, the sort of person one is becoming. For
those tasks an ethics of virtue and character allied to spirituality is more fundamental than an
ethics of rules and individual acts that relies on moral philosophy.
Id. See also Anne E. Patrick, Rosamond Rescued: George Eliot's Critique of Sexism in
Middlemarch, 67 J. RELIGION 220 (1987); NANCY WOLOCH, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1984); and Ann Taves, Mothers and Children in the Legacy of Mid-nineteenth Century
American Christianity, 67 J. RELIGION 203 (1987).
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Religious ethics occurs to me because I am a religious person. I
consciously consult my faith in deciding what to do-and so do most of you.
The interesting thing about religion as material for ethics in the practice of law,
or in any other public calling (and all callings are public), is that it is, when
soundly developed, novel and unsettling. Novel because giving religious reasons
for what we do is unfashionable in "pluralistic" America." And unsettling
because that is what biblical faith is among Jews and Christians-it is
unsettling.' It challenges the notion that any system is competent or adequate
for charting a destiny-for charting the destiny of a people, or a group of
people, or a person. Think of Moses. Think of the Hebrew prophets railing at
the ruling authority in biblical Israel. Think of Francis of Assisi and Martin
Luther. Think of Dr. King, who was always and everywhere and openly a
33. As in DAVID R. BLUMENTHAL, GOD AT THE CENTER: MEDITATIONS ON JEWISH
SPIRITUALITY 29 (1988):
Our personal anxieties are real, but meaningless. Our personal fears are poignant, but
without a greater setting. Only God's relationship to Israel gives significance to our
lives, and only when fear is rooted in significance is it worthy of our human energy.
Meaning is a function of chosenness, not an assumption of personal judgment.
Or as in WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, Covenant as a Subversive Paradigm, in A SOCIAL READING OF
THE OLD TESTAMENT 45 (Patrick D. Miller ed., 1994). "[C]ovenant is possible, not because of a
suitable partner but because this God has broken with conventions." Id. "The [biblical] poet knows
that, even in a world like ours, songs must be sung, dreams must be kept, visions must be practiced.
And none of it yields to the despairing cynicism that the Babylonians want so much to encourage."
Id. at 52.
The novelty in such sentiments may explain some of the furor over the argument that it is
immoral for an American believer to give religious reasons for her politics or jurisprudence.
Professor Stephen Carter made a forceful argument to the contrary in THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:
How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIViALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); my review at 62 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1601 (1994) was, I hope, part of a consequent ethical conversation between (among)
believers.
34. As in LAWRENCE KUSHNER, GOD WAS IN THIS PLACE AND I, 1 DID NOT KNOW (1991),
or WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, The Prophet as a Destabilizing Presence, in A SOCIAL READING OF
THE OLD TESTAMENT, supra note 33, at 221, 225:
The Truth is that because of the enormous fear in our social context, our government
and its allies have constructed for us a fanciful world of fear, threat, security, and well-
being that has little contact with the data at hand. But because we are managers and
benefactors of the system, we fid it easy and natural to accept this imagined world as
real.
Id. In THE THREAT OF LIFE: SERMONS ON PAIN, POWER, AND WEAKNESS (1996), Brueggemann
argues that all of Hebrew scripture is subversive in this way.
Ronald J. Sider, Christian Ethics and the Good News of the Kingdom: Doing Christian Ethics
in an Eschatological Key, in WITHIN THE PERFECTION OF CHRIST 13, 24 (Tery L. Brensinger & E.
Morris Sider eds. 1990), argues that an ethical approach that focuses on the last things (the
messianic age, the second coming) produces six implications for Christian ethics, the third of which
is: "The Christian community is always in every society a disturbing counterculture challenging the
status quo at every point that it is wrong and very aware of the great gulf between the church and
the world." Stringfellow said, "God's people are called now, not now and then." Wylie-
Kellermann, supra note 14, at 118.
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Baptist preacher preaching. Think not only of the persistently unsettling content
of biblical ethics, but also of the mandate that comes with biblical ethics-the
mandate to Abraham and his children, to be a priestly people for the nations;
and the mandate to Christians, to proclaim what Jesus teaches them. These are
mandates to discomfort. Novel and unsettling for a comfortable, overpaid,
modem American legal profession.
I conclude, then, with two sources on the creation of legal ethics, two
sources from which to learn about living the same way in town and at home.
The sources are not motherhood and apple pie. They are motherhood and the
Bible. And they are more radical than you might think.
